CHAPTER II

THE BRITISH DIVISON OF BALUCHITATN AND THE INCORPORATION OF ITS .WESTERNPART INTO IRAN,

1860-1928

This chapter will deal first with the 'British division of Baluchistan in 1871 and then the eventual incorporation of its western part into Iran in 1928. It is a historical analysis of events which preceded the incorporation of western Baluchistan into Iran, beginning with the rise of British colonial hegemony in the region and the ensuing division of Baluchistan into western and eastern halves in 1871. This is essential for a better understanding of the present Baluchi national movement which is rooted in their anti-colonial struggle for reunification of Baluchistan. In this regard the following brief narrative is adopted largely from the official documents found in the British archives as well as the writings of British authorities, involved in shaping and implementing those policies. These documents are the only major recorded sources on the internal events in Baluchistan during the period between 1860 and 1928

The Anglo-Persian Policies and the Division of Baluchistan

Western Baluchistan is bounded by the Lut Desert and the Iranian province of Khorasan in the north, by the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea stretching from the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz to the port of Guadar on the south and northwest, by the province of Kerman on the west, and by the Goldsmid Line separating Pakistani and Afghani Baluchistan on the east. Ethno-geographically it comprises the ]az Murian agricultural basin in the center and northwest, the Sarhad highlands in the north, the Maskkel lowlands and the Sarawan agricultural oasis on the east, the coastal region of Makuran in the south, and the wester-most districts of' Byaban and Bashkard. To this one can add the Helmand Depression inhabited by a mixed ethnic population of Baluch and Seistanis. (1) (See Map 1.)

Historically, as the original homeland of the Baluch, western Baluchistan is the cradle of their past history and, the focus of their ancient heroic ballads and popular poetry. It was from here that their ancestors began to spread to, and consolidate their power in eastern Baluchistn during the period between the thirteenth and the fifteenth century as mentioned in the previous chapter. The territory was the center of the Rind-Lashari Tribal Confederacy prior to the shift of its power to eastern Baluchistan under Amir Chakar Rind in the late fifteenth century. It was also united with the rest of the country under the rule of the khanate of kalat for the greater part of the eighteenth century.

Upon the death of Nasir khan I in 1805 and the subsequent deterioration of the central authority in Kalat, the Baluchi chieftains (hakoms and sardars) of the distant western provinces were the first to succumb to their centrifugal tendencies, which were in turn a function of their tribal/feudal loyalties, and declare their independence. Of these the most important were the principalities of Dizaks, Pahra (Iranshahr), Bampur, Baho-Dashtiari, Geh, Sarbaz, Kasserkand, and the chieftainates of Sarhard and Bashkard. Howeyer, the Narui hereditary rulers of Pahra enjoyed a paramount position among th_ rulers of these principalities, a position \\rhich was held by them until about 1849. At the time of his visit in 1810, Sir Henry Pottinger,  a British officer found western Baluchistan independent and the rule of Shah Mehrab Khan Narui acknowledged from Dizak in the southeast to Bazman bordering Kerman in the north. (2) In 1839 . Hajji Abdun Nabi an Afghan sent by the British to collect intelligence on the political conditions of the country, reported that the Naruis-then under Mohammed Ali Khan ­were still ruling from Bampur, but observed that Muhammed Shah, the Hakom of Sib, had emerged as the strongest Baluchi ruler even though he had no superior position among other chiefs. (3)

Such were the political conditions in western Baluchistan in the mid-nineteenth century when Britain began to move into Kalat, then reduced to eastern Baluchistan, to establish her forward, defense lines against the growing Russian expansion in Central Asia. This objective was accomplished by the Treaty of 1854, which reduced Kalat to a subordinate position by bounding her to abstain from any negotiation with other powers without British consent and gave Britain the right to station troops in whatever part of the country she deemed necessary, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The move was part of an overall strategy to forestall Russian southern expansion toward India and the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean by securing Iran and. Afghanistan as buffer states, separating the British Indian Empire from Russia. (4) Consequently, control of Baluchistan placed the bordrs of the Raj as contiguous to Iran and Afghanistan, thus enabling Britain to counter Russian moves in the two countries whose buffer status was regarded as essential to the defense of India. Moreover, Baluchistan was also viewed by Britain as a significant line of communication linking India with her bases in the Middle East and Europe.

Historically, the consolidation of British power in eastern Baluchistan, which started with the occupation of the Kalt for a short time in 1840, coincides with the beginning of Iranian encroachments on western Baluchistan during the reign of Nasir-al Din Shah (1848-1896) of the Qajar dynasty (.1779-1925). In 1849, an Iranian force was sent to punish the Baluch incursions into Kerman, defeating the latter and capturing Bampur, a major Baluchi town on the edge of Kerman. The Qajar expansion, however, intensified after the extension of the Indo-European Telegraph Line from Karachi to Guadar in the domains of Kalat and then up to Jask on the coast of western Baluchistan in 1861. By the time the line was completed in 1869-70, Iranian forces had advanced as far as Sarbaz between the coast and Bampur. "These conquests, however," wrote Lord Curzon, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and a principal architect of the British policies at that time, "testified to no more than the superior might of the victors, while they left a number of bordering Baluchi states in a position of semi-dependence, which had no sanction save that dictated by fear. (5)

During the course of the British investigation for the construction of the telegraph line, they were confronted by conflicting territorial claims to western Baluchistan by the Shah of Persia, Khan of Kalat, and Sultan of Muscat. At the beginning, the, British took a neutral stand by avoiding to accept pretension of sovereignty by any side. On March 11, 1862, the government of India warned the Secretary of State for India that by entering any arrangement with Persia as to the recognition of her claim, "we could not expect those chiefs [Baluchi] to look without suspicion at such an engagement between our government and that of Shah, although it does not in terms prevent us from neutrality between themselves and Persia," (6) Another official report, dated December 9, 1863, and prepared by the British Commissioner Sir Frederick Goldsmid (then a colonel in charge of telegraph negotiation) for the Secretary of State for India in regard to the Persian Claims, places the question into historical perspective, thus, given in extensor.

As to her [Persia] right, I know of none but of the strong over the weak; of the prestige of a high sounding monarchy over the obscurity .of a small chiefdom. More than one hundred years ago Nadir Shah' appqinted Nussir Khan Brahui, the Beylerbey or Governor of the whole of Baluchistan, inclusive of Mekran, and in such capacity he was no doubt to some extent a feudatory of Persia, but it is also more than a hundred years ago that he exchanged the quasi service of the Shah for that of the Afghan King. His allegiance to Candahar was no less binding than to Persia. It was the allegiance exacted by a stronger arm than his own When the Mghan monarchy fell to pieces the service ceased; but Baluchistan also fell to pieces, and its chiefs set up claims of independence for themselves... Of late years she has perhaps been more than usually active in this re-assertion of Mekaran sovereignty. The present state of affairs in Kelat must be specially favorable to her views. Anarchy in that quarter cannot but afford occasion for intrigue, if not for the actual advance of troops. But no new argument will be needed to show that anything like the dismembenl1ent of Kelat would be as advantageous to Persian interests as detrimental to our own.

If possession for a period of years must necessarily imply "acknowledgement by the local rulers" it is the acknowledgement of helplessness. I do not for a moment believe that the Persian yoke is acceptable to the Sirdars of Mekran west of Kelat. (7)

Subsequently, the British side-stepped the questions of territorial sovereignty and signed separate agreements with the Shah of Persia in 1858, Sultan of Oman in 1865, and the Baluchi chiefs of Bahu, Dastiari, Geh, and Jask in 1869. These agreements dealt only with the question of the protection of telegraph wires and stations, and in each case the British undertook to pay a fixed subsidy to the separate parties involved. The agreements with the Baluch chiefs, which are discussed by Mahmud Mahmud, a contemporary Iranian historian, under the heading of "relations between the British G9vernment and the savage Baluchi tribes,(8) were entered because Persia, in spite of her claims, had no authority in that part of Baluchistan and, as such, the British had to negotiate directly with the independent Baluch chiefs as well as to .depend on them for the protection of, the telegraph lines and stations. (9)

Moreover, the British were well aware that any acknowledgment as to the Persian claims on their part would have been taken by the independent Baluchi chiefs as well as the Khan of Kalat as a sign of Anglo-Persian collaboration and that would have endangered the success of the telegraph negotiations which they had to enter with the Baluchi chiefs. Colonel Goldsmid, then serving as Chief Director of the Indo-European Telegraph and deputed to Tehran to help negotiate a telegraph treaty, reported to the government of, Bombay on October 4, 1865, that although there were objections to the plan by Persia on the basis of her demand for an arrangement as to the acceptance of her claims on Britain's Part, the Baluch opposition constituted the sole obstacle to the scheme. Referring to this difficulty, he stated that:

The sole difficulty that I see in the way is the discontent likely to be raised among the petty Beluch chiefs on the west of Kalat line who may look upon, themselves as given over to Persia by this arrangement. The point is, no doubt, one of great delicacy, but it is presumed that the question must be met if the telegraph line is to be run eventually through these tracts of country, I cannot but believe that we might come to a satisfactory understanding with the Persians to the effect that up to the long strip of Coast formed by the Imam of Muscat, of which Bunder Abbas is the western extremity, we treat the local chiefs as independent in regard to any subsidy given; but carefully stipulate a policy of non-interference in the general question of sovereignty, in which we neither acknowledge or disown the Persian c1aim(10)

Once the telegraph line was completed and its security assured by the Baluchi chiefs, the British began to shift their policy of neutrality in favor of Persia. The official explanation was that Persian encroachment was threatening the security of Kalat as a protected state of British India and, as such, settlement with Persia would serve the interests of Kalat as well. Meanwhile, Persia took advantage of the British Presence in western Baluchistan to consolidate its conquests as 'well as to further her expansion in order to enhance her claims and strengthen her bargaining position. It was during this time that Persian troops first advanced as far as Sarbaz and then suddenly the Wazir of Kerman was officially entitled by his sovereign as Sardar of Baluchistan' around 1866.(11) With the completion of the telegraph line in 1869, the road was paved for an official investigation suggested by Lord Mayo in the same year and the subsequent formation of a joint boundary commission by Persia, Britain, and Kalat, was instigated by the Shah in "1870. Consequently, General Goldsmid was appointed as the British Commissioner on the boundary commission.

The commission, however, was not able to hold a joint meeting due to a strong sense of ill-feeling displayed toward the Kalat delegate by the Persian commissioner Mirza Ma'sum . Khan, who refused to meet with his Baluch counterpart, As a result, General Goldsmid became the sole actor and arbitrator on the issue. In 1871 he received detailed instructions from the Viceroy in Council, who had carefully outlined the limits of a proposed boundary line to be suggested for approval by Persia, but had also added that "a very liberal view may, therefore, be taken of Persian c1aill1S to the west of that line. (12) The proposed line was, in turn, based on Goldsmid's own previous suggestions and reports which had been prepared in connection with his mission concerning the Makuran telegraph. In one of these reports prepared for the government of Bombay and the Secretary of State for India on April 27.1864, he had underlined the basic historical argument for recognizing the Persian c1ai_s as to the ---click here for next page--->>