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The Pahlavi-Baluch Military Confrontation: Annexation of
Baluchista
The anticipated final
military showdown between the forces of Reza Shah and Amir Doust
Mohammad Khan Baluch took place in 1928. General Jahabani, the commander
of the Iranian forces in his book Amalyyat-e Qushoon Dar Baluchistan
(The campaigns of the Armed Forces in Baluchistan), has stated that
the decision to invade Baluchistan was taken
by
Reza shah in 1927, but the military operations were postponed for the
following year pending further preparation. Prior to the beginning of
the conflict, the commanding Iranian general issued a statement in which
the Baluch were promised exemption from all the previous unpaid taxes
and that the taxes collected afterwards would be spent exclusively for
the development pf their own region for the next ten years, thus hoping
to lessen their support for Doust Mohammad. As to the plight of Amir
Doust Mohammad Khan himself, the statement said that since he had ruled
and protected his "ancient cradle," and had faced many difficu1tis for
that sake, “his services would be taken into consideration and his place
[position] secured provided that he surrender, and of course, he would
be endowed with royal favors as well."
(43)
The ruler of
Baluchistan;
however, refused to surrender and replied that "he is not at war with
the government and trust in God" according to General Jahanbani. The
author, however, has confirmed that, on the basis of the final military
intelligence report received by him, the Baluch religious leaders had
issued an opinion (fetva) to the effect that "the military
forces [of Iran], were infidels and the enemy of the Baluch honor and
religion, thus calling for Jihad [holy war] .”
As a result, the report added, the populace had taken up the call
for preparation to join military actions and "were extremely suspicious
of the Armed Forces. “(44).
The report underlines not only the extent of
the hostile feelings between the two sides, but also underscores the
widespread popular support for Doust Mohammad’s decision to confront
the Iranian forces.
The Iranian forces consisted of three
regiments (teep), brought together from the neighboring provinces
of
Kerman, Khorasan, and Seistan and supported by the units of the then
small Iranian air force. In addition, they were also assisted by a force
of 500 Baluchi militia from Sarhad. Jahanbani calculated the total
Baluchi men-at-arms at more than 14,000, of which 5,000 were headed
directly by Doust Mohanlmad's commanders and a little more than 7,500
were to be supplied by other hakoms under his role upon request. Doust
Mohammad Khan had stationed his forces in the forts of the major Baluchi
towns-such as Dizak, Pahra, and Bampur-while the forts of coastal
Makuran were protected by the local rulers. (45).
Subsequently, General Jahanbani launched his
preplanned operation in 1928. Contrary to the anticipation of the
Baluchi ruler that the main attack would come against Bampur through the
classical invasion route from Kerman, the Iranian general directed the
thrust of his offensive toward the forts 'of Dizak bordering
British-held Baluchistan, thus utilizing the element of surprise. The
main goal of this military .move, however was to prevent Doust Mohammad
from receiving any aid from his “brethren” in eastern Baluchistan and
Afghanistan, on the one hand, and to cut his escape route to those
countries; on the other hand. The general also stated that prior to the
operation the Iranian government had also secured British cooperation to
prevent the Baluch under their control from coming to the aid of their
"religious brethren'; in western
Baluchistan.
Moreover, .as one of the main agricultural centers of Baluchistan, the
heavily defended Dizak region constituted a major blasé of supply of men
and materials for the Baranzai ruler, thus, capturing it first would
have forced the latter to submit much earlier by squeezing his
resources. (46)
Nevertheless, the government forces confronted heavy resistance
and were forced to advance slowly from fort to fort suffering heavy
casualties. In this regard, air power proved effective in reducing the
Baluchi forts. As a result, the war lasted for seven months before Doust
Mohammad was persuaded to surrender with the promise of royal favor. The
extent of the intensity of the resistance is best evidenced from the
observations of General Jahnbani himself in the battle for the main fort
of Dizak,
I was amazed by [seeing! how much a smaller force dared to resist
the victorious regular forces equipped with artillery and machine gun
and even not giving any lll1portance to being surrounded and what hope
did they have and what feelings to stimulate such a sacrifice in them?
Was such a resistances a manifestation of
bravery or the result of a deficiency in thought and the lack of
awareness as to the principles of warfare?
Of course, there were no sacred feelings to encourage such a
savage multitu4e for sacrifices. The few religious declarations by their
[religious! leaders had caused them to view the newly arrived armed
forces as infidel and had spread the word that their honor and religion
would be in danger in the case of victory by the anl1ed forces.
In my opinion the reason for such resistance with no result and
with, such a madness, as was being 9bserved lies in the historical
legends, namely, the stories told by the elders of the nation in which
the arrival of the Iranian forces in the land of Baluchistan was always
viewed with a sense of ridicule and described how the Iranian .force_
had come to this region ti_l1e after time and in the face of the great
and invincible forts left for their country with heavy losses and the
utmost sense of hopelessness and the small groups which had more courage
to remain behind lost their lives after the arrival of the hot season or
evacuated Baluchistan upon having been fully humiliated. (4.7)
He has also acknowledged that since none of
the defenders surrendered, they had to be eliminated one by one in order
to secure the fort. (48) There is no explanation for such a resistance
other than Baluch desire to preserve their traditional independence and
to resist political control by the non-Baluch.
There were several important
factors contributing to the defeat of Doust Mohammad and the
incorporation of
Baluchistan
into
Iran.
The first was British approval and support of Reza Shah's move. In this
regard, British policy was motivated by its concern for strengthening
the Iranian governl11ent and the state in order to contain the spread of
the Bolshvik Revolution of 1917. Britain feared that an independent
western
Baluchistan
under the anti-British Doust Mohammad could have inflamed the same
tendency among its own Baluch and would have made a weak Baluchi entity
an easy potential prey to the new Soviet state. Relying on British
military reports on Khurasan (Iran),
Inayatullah Baluch, a Baluchi historian, has asserted that the majority
of the Baluch in
Iran
were at the time in favor of the
Soviet Union
because of their anti-British feelings. (49)
Moreover, as has been pointed out by C.P
Skrine (then a British consular officer serving in Kern1an, Baluchistan,
and Seistan), the British transferred the control of the Sarhad District
(which had been connected by railway to east Baluchistan) to Persia in
1924 in order to support her planned move in Baluchistan. (50)
Accordingly, the district was used as a staging point for Iranian
operations against the settled southern hinterland of
Baluchistan
in 1928. Correspondingly, the British-controlled tribes of Sarhad were
persuaded through the instrumentality of Eido Reiki, a Sarhad vulnerable
to defection by some hakoms or sardars who viewed the increasing
concentration of power in the hands of the Baranzai ruler as a threat to
their traditional hereditary privileges. As a result, Jahanbani reports
that several hakoms in the Dizak District defected to him during the
course of the military operation. Moreover, although few members of the
ruling class may have been exposed to modern nationalistic ideas through
their contacts with the British and the Baluch of the east, the society
at large was highly underdeveloped socially and economically. There were
no notable middle class or other modern classes, which are identified as
the base of modern nationalism, as will be seen in the next chapter.
The military incorporation
of western
Baluchistan
into
Iran
is the most significant historical event in the modern history of the
Baluch and their homeland. It marks the end of an era known by the
Baluch as the Baluch Doura, during which they were free from any
pretension of political control by the non-Baluch.<<---Go to Index---
(44) Ibid., p. 57 (45) Ibid. pp. 41-47,58.
46) Ibid., pp. 49,58- 70. (47) Ibid., p. 70.
(48)1bid.. p. 76 (49) Inayatollah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pastunistan-baluchistan,"
AussenPolitick31 (1980).293. (50) Skrine,
p.
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